State of Utah v. Olsen : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
State of Utah v. Olsen : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Utah State Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Utah County Public Defenders Assoc.; Attorney for appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State of Utah v. Jeremy S. Olsen, No. 950450 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6757
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. QfcCAsG-Cft* THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FILED 
MAY 1 3 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JEREMY S. OLSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950450-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, FROM THE ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
ENTERED IN THIS CASE BY THE HONORABLE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Counsel for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
Utah County Public Defenders Assoc. 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
Counsel for Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. \ 
JEREMY S. OLSEN, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. J 
: Case No. 950450-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, FROM THE ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
ENTERED IN THIS CASE BY THE HONORABLE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Counsel for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
Utah County Public Defenders Assoc. 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
Counsel for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
POINT I OLSEN'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO 
CONSIDER THE RELEVANT STATUTORY CRITERIA HAS NOT 
BEEN WAIVED 1 
POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS 
ORDER OF RESTITUTION 3 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 5 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutory Provisions 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201(4) 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201(8) 
Cases Cited 
State v. Bywater, 748 P.2d 568 (Utah 1987) 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, s 
VS. ! 
JEREMY S. OLSEN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. 2 
: Case No. 950450-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
OLSEN'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER 
THE RELEVANT STATUTORY CRITERIA HAS NOT BEEN WAIVED 
The State argues that Olsen has waived any claim that the 
trial court committed reversible error by failing to consider all 
relevant statutory criteria, and by failing to make its reasons 
for its award of restitution part of the record, because Olsen 
did not adequately raise these issues in the trial court and 
because the appellate record is incomplete (Br. of Appellee at 
11-15). Olsen disagrees. 
One, the scheduling of a restitution hearing itself clearly 
places before the trial court the statutory requirements as set 
forth in Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-3-201(4) & (8) surrounding 
such an award of restitution. In awards of restitution, as with 
the imposition of most criminal penalties, it is the 
responsibility of the trial court to apply the law to the facts. 
1 
Cf., Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 771-72 (Utah 1985) (Waiver 
of punitive damage claim arising out of instruction to the jury). 
Moreover, in this case the trial court did not allow in this 
case a contemporaneous objection to his application of law to 
fact. At the close of the restitution hearing the trial judge, 
who was late for a meeting, simply took the matter under 
advisement (R. 116, 121-22). Cf., State v. Bvwater, 748 P.2d 
568, 569 (Utah 1987) (Waiver of claim for failure to object when 
trial court issued the sentence orally at conclusion of 
sentencing proceeding). Later the trial court issued a written 
restitution order, which failed to consider all relevant factors, 
and which failed to make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. See, Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-3-201(4) & (8); 
Brief of Appellant at 8-10. 
Two, the appellate record is adequate for this Court to rule 
on the issues before it. The State is correct that the appellate 
record does not contain the presentence report. However, the 
report itself—and whether or not it contained information 
pertaining to Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201(4)(c)—is not 
relevant to the issues before this Court. What is relevant in 
this case is the fact that the trial court "received and 
considered" the report prior to the imposition of probation on 
May 31, 1995, which took place a week before the order of 
restitution was made (R. 27). What is at issue here is not the 
statutory criteria, but the trial court's failure to demonstrate 
that all relevant statutory criteria had been considered and the 
2 
trial court's failure to make its reasons for the award of 
restitution a part of the record. 
The State is also correct that the appellate record does not 
include a transcript of the sentencing hearing conducted on May 
31f 1996. However, the reason it was not requested is because it 
is not relevant to the issues of restitution before this Court. 
Restitution was not "determined" at that sentencing hearing (R. 
26); and a subsequent restitution hearing was conducted on June 
8, 1996—a transcript of which is included in the appellate 
record (R. 46-123). 
Because Olsen has not waived the errors he claims on appeal, 
he respectfully asks this Court to consider the issues raised and 
to reverse the trial court's restitution order. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ITS ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
The State claims that the trial court's factual findings 
concerning the amount of restitution are not clearly erroneous, 
and therefore, the trial court's award of restitution should be 
affirmed (Br. of Appellee at 15-19 (citations omitted)). Olsen 
disagrees. 
As noted by the State, evidence in support of an award of 
damages must be reasonable, and must "rise above speculation" 
(Br. of Appellee at 17). Here, however, the trial court's award 
of restitution was based upon speculative and unreasonable 
estimates. 
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One, at the restitution hearing, Richard Wright, the victim, 
testified that cash and change totalling approximately $800 was 
taken from two coffee cans (R. 28, 57). However, Wright admitted 
that the $800 figure was nothing more than an estimate and that 
he had never counted the money in the cans nor did he have an 
inventory list (R. 57, 77). Yet, the trial court ordered Olsen 
to pay Wright $800 for the money in the cans. 
Two, Wright testified that antique coins were taken which 
had a value of $13,500.50 (R. 28, 29, 60). But the only actual 
valuation or inventory of the coin collection was done by Wright 
and his son approximately fifteen years previous and that the 
coins had not been touched since (R. 60, 62, 63, 80-81 J.1 Again 
the trial court, based solely upon Wright's speculative estimate 
of replacement costs, ordered Olsen to pay $13,500.50 for the 
coins—coins which Wright had not seen in fifteen years. 
Three, the trial court ordered that Olsen pay $4500 for 
monies taken from a wallet based upon a "note" found by Wright in 
the storage room after the burglary (R. 28, 55-56, 58-59). 
However, this award is speculative and unreasonable because 
Wright testified that the note was probably written in 1979 (R. 
73-74) and that since 1979 he had taken money from the room 
Although Wright testified that in preparation for the 
restitution hearing "he called a guy that dealt with coins" who 
gave him a conservative estimate on the phone, that estimate is 
still speculative because it was conducted on the phone and 
concerned only an inventory list that had been compiled over 
fifteen years previous. 
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approximately twice but that he did not remember how much he took 
or from what location (R. 74-75). 
In addition, Wright testified that 1988 was the only time he 
ever made a complete inventory list of what property was kept in 
the storage room (R. 71) although he also testified that in 1989 
he "counted it" and "came up with... $22,090" (R. 75). 
Olsen asserts that the trial court "abused its discretion" 
in ordering Olsen to pay the full-value of Wright's "estimates"— 
particularly in light of Olsen's testimony that all but 
approximately $1500-2000 of the money taken was recovered by the 
sheriff's department (R. 101-102). Wright's estimates were 
speculative, unreasonable, and based upon evidence of inventories 
taken by him anywhere from six to sixteen years previous. 
Therefore, Olsen asks this Court to vacate the trial court's 
order of restitution and to remand the matter to the trial court 
for reconsideration of the question of restitution. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the trial court's failure to consider all legally 
relevant factors and its failure to make the reasons for the 
award part of the record, and based upon the fact that the 
restitution order was based upon unreasonably speculative 
evidence, Olsen asks this court to vacate the order of 
restitution and to remand the case for reconsideration of the 
question of restitution. 
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DATED this ! 7) day of May, 1996. 
Margaret P. Lindsay /y 
Counsel for Olsen ^ 
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